TSA Duration, Cost and Stranded-Cost Benchmarks: A Sourced Reference
17 September 2026 · 10 min read
By the MeridianCogent team — built from working with integration offices, separation leaders and PE operating partners on M&A execution. This is a reference page, not an argument. We built it because we kept re-deriving the same numbers from the same handful of sources across our own work, and a single sourced table didn't exist anywhere we could find.
Every number below traces to a named source. Where sources disagree, we show both rather than picking one. Where a figure is a range rather than a point estimate, we show the range rather than collapsing it to a false-precision average. This page will be updated as better data becomes available — if you have a source we should include, or a figure that has moved, tell us at hello@meridiancogent.com.
TSA duration by workstream
Duration figures are the most cited and least consistent numbers in carve-out planning, largely because "duration" gets measured differently across sources — some report the base term as signed, others report actual elapsed time including extensions. We've noted which is which where the source specifies.
| Workstream | Typical base term | Source basis |
|---|---|---|
| IT infrastructure | 10–16 months | Industry TSA structuring analysis (BD Emerson); consistently the longest-running workstream across sources |
| ERP / accounting systems | 8–12 months | BD Emerson; corroborated by carve-out ERP case data (Pemeco Consulting) |
| HR / payroll | 6–10 months | BD Emerson |
| Customer support | 6–9 months | BD Emerson |
| Procurement / supply chain | 5–8 months | BD Emerson |
| Tax filing | 4–8 months | BD Emerson |
| Treasury | 3–6 months | BD Emerson |
| Marketing / brand co-use | 3–6 months | BD Emerson |
| Overall range, standalone acquisitions | 3–6 months per workstream | Dealroom carve-out timing analysis |
| Overall range, complex parent carve-outs | 6–24 months | KPMG carve-out guidance |
| Overall range, public-to-private deals | 12+ months on finance workstreams | KPMG carve-out guidance, citing added tax and regulatory complexity |
Reading this table correctly: duration varies more by deal type than by workstream category. A standalone private acquisition with narrow TSA scope and a public-to-private take-private with full finance and tax entanglement are not comparable, even when the workstream labels match.
TSA extension and step-up pricing
This is the number practitioners ask about most and the one with the widest genuine variation, because extension pricing is negotiated per-deal rather than benchmarked industry-wide.
| Extension band | Typical premium over base rate | Source |
|---|---|---|
| First extension period | 15–25% monthly premium | Industry TSA structuring analysis (BD Emerson, Dealroom) |
| Extended/legacy TSA periods | Up to 50–100%+ premium | Practitioner-reported step-up structures, cited in TSA advisory case material |
| KPMG-documented accelerated exit | 2–3 months post-close achievable with disciplined pre-close readiness planning | KPMG carve-out guidance |
The mechanism, not just the number: extension pricing exists specifically to punish delay. A service still running six months past its base term should cost meaningfully more than the same service at month one — if it doesn't, the pricing structure isn't doing its job. When you're negotiating a TSA, the step-up schedule matters more than the base rate.
Stranded cost ranges
The most consequential and least understood number in a divestiture, because it's a seller-side cost that shows up as a margin decline rather than a line item anyone budgets for.
| Metric | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Stranded cost as % of divested unit's IT/overhead allocation | 20–40% | BD Emerson stranded cost sizing analysis |
| Companies with profitability drop >3.3pp in year 1 post-divestiture | 51% | Deloitte, analysis of divestitures over the past two decades |
| Median SG&A increase (relative) among affected companies | 1.7 percentage points | Deloitte UK, "Unlocking value: approaching stranded costs in M&A" |
| Companies taking 4+ years to recover from that margin drop | 3 in 5 | Deloitte |
| Standalone cost vs. parent-allocated cost for shared services | Up to 200% higher | McKinsey carve-out cost structure analysis |
| Data readiness workstream cost, mid-market carve-out | €500k–3M | PortMux carve-out data readiness analysis; range driven by system count and complexity |
| Data readiness workstream duration | 4–9 months | PortMux |
The compounding trap: a stranded cost discovered at month 3 post-close is a manageable line item. The same cost, unaddressed, reallocated across remaining business units by month 18, is invisible — which is precisely why the median recovery time is measured in years rather than quarters.
Deal volume and structural context
Numbers that explain why the above matters at the scale it does.
| Metric | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Buy-side carve-outs as % of all M&A deals >$100M (2018–2023) | ~28% | McKinsey |
| Large deals including a carve-out/divestiture component (2026) | 70–90% | Deloitte 2026 Global Divestiture Survey and M&A research |
| Carve-out deals failing to create underwritten value | ~1 in 3 | McKinsey |
| Top-quartile vs. average carve-out MOIC (data since 2012) | 2.5x vs. 1.5x | Bain & Company |
| 2026 Global Divestiture Survey sample size | 979 sellers, 569 buyers | Deloitte |
| Top seller-side post-close pressure, per that survey | Stranded costs, alongside TSA complexity and financial reporting | Deloitte |
| Top challenges in carve-out integration, per Bain's 2025 practitioner survey | Cultural differences and process/technology issues, ahead of TSA negotiation and talent retention | Bain & Company, 2025 M&A Practitioners Outlook Survey |
Change-of-control and consent timing
Less quantified in public research than TSA and stranded costs, but the mechanics are well-documented by legal practitioners.
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Standard deemed-consent fallback period | 30 days | Standard drafting practice cited across contract practitioner guidance, where a "not unreasonably withheld" clause sets no explicit deadline |
| Government contract novation regime | FAR Subpart 42.12; separate approval process, not a negotiated commercial consent | Federal Acquisition Regulation |
| HSR filing threshold (as of Feb 2026) | $133.9 million transaction size | Federal Trade Commission, 2026 HSR thresholds |
What we couldn't find good public data on
In the interest of the same standard we hold everything else to: cutover and hypercare cost data, and integration governance/workstream structuring benchmarks, are both areas where the available material is practitioner guidance rather than quantified research. We're not publishing invented percentages to fill that gap. If you know of a genuinely sourced figure in either area, we'd want to include it — email us.
How we use this ourselves
This table is the backbone of several of our own articles — what a TSA actually is, the real cost of a late exit, and stranded costs each draw on a subset of it. We built the full reference because assembling it piecemeal, article by article, meant re-finding the same handful of sources every time. If it saves you the same trouble, it's done its job.
Primary sources referenced throughout: McKinsey & Company (carve-out deal analysis 2018–2023; carve-out cost structure and value-creation research); Bain & Company (carve-out MOIC data since 2012; 2025 M&A Practitioners Outlook Survey); Deloitte (2026 Global Divestiture Survey, n=979 sellers/569 buyers; UK stranded cost research; divestiture profitability outcomes research); KPMG (carve-out guidance); BD Emerson (TSA structuring, IT separation and stranded cost sizing analysis); Dealroom (carve-out timing analysis); PortMux (carve-out data readiness research); U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2026 HSR thresholds); Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 42.12.